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THE STATE AND REGIONAL ROLE IN
DEVELOPING ECOSYSTEM SERVICE
MARKETS
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ecosystem services literature and the theoretical models of
ecosystem service markets have so far been based upon a few wellstudied examples—most notably New York City’s mid-1990s
purchase and preservation of land in the Catskills watershed to meet
1
its water purification goals. Since then, around the nation, state and
local governments, businesses, and non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) have moved beyond the theoretical and single transactions
to develop and test a variety of ecosystem service markets. Oregon
environmental groups, governments, and businesses have been
leaders in supporting and encouraging market development and
working with regional partners interested in cooperation at larger
2
scales. Nearby, the Puget Sound Partnership is creating a soundwide ecosystem restoration plan and the tools to move a restoration
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** Courtesy Faculty, Institute for Natural Resources, Oregon State University. Mr.
Mauger received his J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in December 2008 and
was selected for a Dean's Post-Graduate Fellowship from the Law School to fund the position.
1. See Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the Biosphere, 391
NATURE 629 (1998); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE
WATER SUPPLY: ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY STRATEGY (2000).
2. The Oregon Business Plan, developed by business leaders, supports increasing the use
of ecosystem service marketplaces. It has helped form an Ecosystem Services Council. See
Oregon Business Plan: The Plan, http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/accomplishments.html
(last visited June 4, 2010).
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agenda forward. Other states and countries now are turning to
Oregon and the Pacific Northwest to learn how they can make
ecosystem markets work. As Oregon remains at the forefront of
these markets, lessons learned from Oregon’s experiments may
provide a foundation for expanding ecosystem markets around the
world.
This article first describes five different types of ecosystem
service markets in Oregon. The article next highlights the lessons
learned from these markets, and then discusses the potential role of
state government in market development based on these
observations. The final section of the article describes Senate Bill
4
513, a recently adopted Oregon law aimed at promoting ecosystem
market development, and reflects on its implications for future
market development and expansion.
II. OREGON’S STATE-LEVEL EXPERIMENTATION
A. Carbon Dioxide and Greenhouse Gases
The public is more familiar with carbon markets than other
ecosystem service markets, as President Obama and the 111th
5
Congress work to pass a national cap-and-trade program as part of a
global effort to limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases (GHGs).
The cap-and-trade marketplace is
designed as one solution to combat global climate change. Centuries
of industrialization and fossil fuel combustion have increased
6
atmospheric GHG concentrations, contributing to a worldwide
7
increase in global average temperatures and local climate changes.
People, governments, and businesses worldwide are now trying to
curb or sequester greenhouse gas production to mitigate climate
change.

3. See generally Puget Sound Partnership, http://www.psp.wa.gov (last visited June 4,
2010).
4. S.B. 513, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
5. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11th Cong. (as passed by
House, Jun. 26, 2009).
6. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR4): CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007) (showing
a 70% increase of annual GHG emissions since 1970).
7. See id. at 38-54.
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Many ecosystems naturally store large quantities of carbon
8
dioxide in trees, soils, and biomass. Because storing carbon dioxide
reduces the total amount of atmospheric carbon and its associated
effects, this is a valuable ecosystem service even if it had never been
historically thought of in monetary terms. Carbon markets provide a
way to foster the creation or preservation of nature’s creditsequestering services. Carbon markets allow greenhouse gas emitters
who may have to reduce their emissions to invest in carbon
sequestration or to purchase offset credits from other emitters,
9
allowing them to make reductions more cheaply.
The federal government has only recently begun to implement
10
national carbon dioxide policies. Oregon, alongside other states, has
11
In 1997,
long led American efforts to combat climate change.
Oregon enacted the nation’s first emission reduction standard,
requiring new fossil-fueled power plants to reduce the emission of
12
carbon dioxide (CO2) to 0.7 pounds per kilowatt-hour. From the
beginning of the reduction standard, power plant facilities were
allowed to purchase offsets to meet these CO2-emissions goals by
buying credits from a qualified organization or by creating projects
13
themselves. Oregon’s Energy Facility Siting Council monitors and
evaluates all credits and offsets, but third parties, such as those
14
described below, can create them.
8. Dennis D. Hirsch, Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the Clean
Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 623, 629 (2007).
9. Id. at 627–28.
10. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health
and the Environment (Dec. 7, 2009) (announcing EPA’s endangerment finding for six
greenhouse gases).
11. See generally BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE & STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Nov.
2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states_greenhouse.pdf; See also
JAMES A. ROBINSON, Note, Shaping Oregon Climate Policy in Light of the Kyoto Protocol, 21 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 207, 227–33 (2006). The city of Portland, Oregon has also been long
involved in targeting climate change. In 1993, it became the first city to adopt a climate strategy.
Id.; CITY OF PORTLAND, GLOBAL WARMING REDUCTION STRATEGY (Nov. 1993), available at
http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=41917&a=112110 (focusing on transportation,
energy efficiency, cogeneration, recycling, and tree planting). Portland has updated its plan,
most recently in November 2009. CITY OF PORTLAND, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (Sept. 2009),
available at http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=41896 (focusing on green building,
clean energy, green jobs, efficient urban planning, recycling, urban forests and ecosystems, local
agriculture, and community engagement).
12. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503 (2007);
OR. ADMIN. R. § 345-024-0500 – 0720 (2009).
13. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503.
14. Id.
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1. The Climate Trust
Adoption of the reduction standard legislation in 1997 also gave
birth to the Climate Trust, and organization established to finance
carbon credit projects to resell to power plants required to meet the
15
state standard. Through 2010, the Climate Trust remains the sole
organization qualified to generate credits for Oregon’s emissions
16
program. Since its inception, The Climate Trust has emerged as one
of the largest bankers of offsets in the United States with $8.8 million
17
invested in a diverse portfolio of carbon reduction projects. This
portfolio includes 16 projects of nine different types expected to
18
offset nearly 2.8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide. In addition
to investing in carbon credit projects, The Climate Trust provides
customized offset-acquisition services for large emitters, voluntary
programs for organizations and events, and consulting on climate
19
projects, policy, and strategy.
Adopting the CO2 emission reduction standard as a credit driver
and creating of The Climate Trust allowed Oregon lawmakers,
environmental organizations, and businesses to see how an ecosystem
service market could deliver efficient, cost-effective environmental
results. Several Oregon power plants have purchased mandated
offsets and other Oregon companies have worked with The Climate
20
Trust to help them voluntarily develop waste-to-energy programs.
2. Ecotrust
Ecotrust was founded in Portland, Oregon in 1991 to bring the
best sustainability and conservation ideas from around the world to
21
the United States. Ecotrust provides its clients consulting, capital,
knowledge, organization, and innovation to conservation in order to

15. The Climate Trust, History, http://www.climatetrust.org/history.html (last visited June
4, 2010).
16. THE CLIMATE TRUST, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://
www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/2008 Annual Report.pdf; Oregon.gov, Energy Facility Siting
Standards,
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/standards.shtml#Carbon_Dioxide_Emissions (listing
The Climate Trust as the only qualified organization).
17. See id. at 7.
18. The Climate Trust, Offset Portfolio, http://www.climatetrust.org/offset.html (last visited
June 4, 2010).
19. The Climate Trust, Climate Services, http://www.climatetrust.org/climate_services.html
(last visited June 4, 2010).
20. See THE CLIMATE TRUST, supra note 16, at 2, 4, 11.
21. Ecotrust, About Us, http://www.ecotrust.org/about/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
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22

tackle a variety of ecological, economic, and social problems. As
one of its consulting specialties, Ecotrust advises communities, tribes,
and land managers on how they can successfully implement carbon
23
offset programs to generate verifiable and salable credits. These
credits allow forest owners to manage their resources to maximize
24
carbon sequestration, not just timber production. In addition to
consulting, Ecotrust has also taken the lead advocating for ecosystem
service markets across the Pacific Northwest. It helped Portland
become the host site for the first international Katoomba conference
25
on ecosystem markets held in the United States, and it is working
with the Western Climate Initiative to support inclusion of forest
26
carbon storage offsets in its cap-and-trade programs.
Ecotrust now invests directly in carbon storage with the 2004
27
formation of Ecotrust Forest Management, Inc.
This Ecotrust
subsidiary currently manages 12,449 acres in four temperate rain
28
forests. These forests will provide financial returns from a mixture
of carbon credits, easements, forest waste as biofuel, non-timber
forest products, and timber harvest, while promoting native species,
29
forest health, habitat, and biodiversity.
B. Water Quantity
Even before Oregon’s carbon market started in 1997, Oregon
had experience experimenting with markets to restore streamflow for
30
aquatic habitat. Like other Western states, Oregon allocates water

22. See id.
23. Ecotrust, Forest Management Planning for Carbon, Ecosystems, and Communities,
http://www.ecotrust.org/trees/ (last visited June 4, 2010).
24. Ecotrust, Ecosystem Services, http://www.ecotrust.org/ecosystemservices/ (last visited
June 4, 2010).
25. Ecotrust, Portland Katoomba, http://www.ecotrust.org/katoomba/ (last visited June 4,
2010); Katomomba Group, Making the Priceless Valuable: Jumpstarting Environmental
Markets, http://www.katoombagroup.org/~katoomba/event_details.php?id=11 (last visited June
4, 2010) (describing the Portland conference).
26. Ecotrust, Western Climate Initiative, http://www.ecotrust.org/wci/ (last visited June 4,
2010).
27. Ecotrust Forest Management, Inc., http://www.ecotrustforests.com/ (last visited June 4,
2010).
28. ECOTRUST FOREST MANAGEMENT, INC., FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN 9 (Mar. 2009),
available at http://www.ecotrustforests.com/EFM_Plan_public_summary_March_2009.pdf
29. See generally id; ECOTRUST FOREST MANAGEMENT, INC., INVESTOR GUIDE, available
at http://www.ecotrustforests.com/EcoForests_investor_book.pdf.
30. The
Freshwater
Trust,
Why
We
Need
a
Water
Trust,
http://
www.thefreshwatertrust.org/who-we-are/about-us (last visited June 4, 2010).
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from rivers based on the prior appropriation doctrine. This “first in
time, first in right” doctrine means that earlier acquired “senior”
32
water rights have priority over later “junior” rights. This system
33
lends itself to a market, subject to numerous regulations. Holders of
senior water rights may sell or transfer their right to divert water to
34
others. In theory, this should move water to its highest economic
use, as those who can generate more economic value from the water
can afford to acquire senior water rights. The private water market
should efficiently allocate water between traditional water uses (i.e.,
agriculture, municipalities, and industry); however, water markets
have been slow to develop even for reallocation of traditional
35
consumptive water rights.
36
Oregon was one of the first states to protect instream flows for
what are now called “ecosystem services,” which it did in 1955 but
37
only by administrative rule. A more market-based approach toward
conserving instream water was adopted with the passage of the
38
Instream Water Rights Act in 1987. This Act formally recognized
instream flow as a beneficial use and authorized the sale, gift, and
39
leasing of existing water rights to instream uses. This expanded
potential water-market participants to include conservation
organizations that could purchase water rights to “re-water” Oregon
40
creeks and streams.
Since then, a number of innovative

31. See RICH BASTASCH, THE OREGON WATER HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO WATER AND
WATER MANAGEMENT 54–57 (2006 rev. ed. of WATERS OF OREGON, 1998).
32. See id. at 56–57; OR. WATER RES. DEP’T, AN INTRODUCTION TO WATER LAWS:
WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON 4–7 (2008), available at www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/aquabook.pdf.
33. See OR. ADMIN. R. ch. 690 divs. 380 & 385; BASTACH, supra note 31, at 132–36.
34. See BASTASCH, supra note 31 at 132–136; OR. WATER RES. DEP’T, supra note 32, at
29–30.
35. BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER
IN CALIFORNIA (2000); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST:
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
36. For a definition and brief discussion of instream flows, see the State of Washington
Department of Ecology’s website, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/
isfhm.html.
37. See generally, Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Symposium Article:
Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125 (2006)
(explaining Oregon’s history of instream flow protection); Janet Neuman, Symposium Article:
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 438 (2004).
38. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332–360 & 455–500 (2007).
39. Id.
40. See Neuman et al., supra note 37, at 1151–53.
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organizations and programs have developed to use water markets to
restore streamflows and the ecosystem services they provide.
1. Oregon Water Trust/The Fresh Water Trust
The Oregon Water Trust (OWT) was the first water trust in the
nation when it was founded in 1993 with the goal of restoring surface
water flows in Oregon through science-driven, market-based, and
41
cooperative solutions.
To reach these goals, OWT focuses on
purchasing or leasing water rights in small tributary streams where
42
small amounts of water provide significant ecological benefits. They
also work to help farmers and other water users improve their
efficiency through water conservation and then convert the “saved”
43
water into increased instream water rights.
Through these
mechanisms, The OWT/Freshwater Trust’s portfolio of water rights is
now more than 150 cubic feet per second (cfs; 100 million gallons per
44
day).
2. Deschutes River Conservancy
The Deschutes River Conservancy (“the DRC”) works to
improve water quality and streamflow in the Deschutes Basin of
45
Central Oregon. It was created in 1996 by the Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, several local irrigation
districts, and environmental organizations. It is authorized to receive
46
federal funding for watershed restoration. The DRC operates much
41. See generally id.; Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water
Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 496 (2004); Lynne Marie Paretchan, Choreographing NGO
Strategies to Protect Instream Flows, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 33 (2002); The Freshwater Trust,
supra note 30. OWT recently merged with Oregon Trout to become The Freshwater Trust, but
it continues to operate a simlar focus and mission.
The Freshwater Trust, http://
www.thefreshwatertrust.org/conservation/stream-flow/approach (last visited June 5, 2010). This
paper will use the abbrevition OWT to refer to both the previous Oregon Water Trust and the
newly renamed The Freshwater Trust.
42. Id.
43. See Neuman, supra note 37, at 444–45.
44. The Freshwater Trust, From the Trust, 1 FRESHWATER 30 (Fall 2009).
45. Deschutes River Conservancy, About Us, http://www.deschutesriver.org/About_Us/
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Oregon Resource Conservation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
301(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to pay "up to 50
percent" of the cost of approved projects) (reauthorized by the Deschutes Resources
Conservancy Reauthorization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-270, 114 Stat. 791 (2000)). These
matching sources include corporate, foundation, and individual funding, state and federal
agencies, as well as the development of fee-for-service enterprises. About the Deschutes
Resources Conservancy, http://www.deschutesrc.org/about/about.htm (last accessed Mar. 24,
2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
46. Deschutes River Conservancy, supra note 45.
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like other water trusts by acquiring water through conservation
projects, water leases, and water rights purchases. One type of
47
conservation project is the piping and lining of irrigation ditches.
DRC’s lining projects help reduce the excessive seepage and
evaporation losses from diverted irrigation water in unlined ditches.
The DRC piping and lining projects resulted in 54 cfs (35 million
48
gallons per day) of permanent instream flow restoration. Moreover,
the DRC is active in water leasing, which allows water owners to
continue “beneficially using” water rights they are not presently using
49
for irrigation by leasing them to the DRC for instream purposes.
The DRC also purchases water rights outright and accepts donations
50
of water rights that are no longer needed by their current owners.
Both the owned and leased water is returned to instream usage to
51
restore instream flows for a season or permanently.
Beyond acquiring water rights to increase instream flow, the
52
DRC collaborates with Deschutes basin water users through the
Deschutes Water Alliance Water Bank and Groundwater Mitigation
53
Bank to provide mitigation credits needed by cities, real estate
developers, and others to offset new groundwater withdrawals.
Under state law, new groundwater permit applicants in the Deschutes

47. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Conservation, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Conservation (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
48. Id.
49. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Leasing, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Leasing (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). It is
important to landowners to be legally seen as “beneficially using” their water rights so they do
not risk forfeiting them. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.310(1); BASTASCH, supra note 31, 59–60.
50. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Transfers, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Transfers (last visited June 4, 2010).
51. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Leasing, supra note 49.
52. The current members of the Deschutes Water Alliance are the Deschutes River
Conservancy, Central Oregon Irrigation District, Swalley Irrigation District, City of Bend, City
of Redmond, and Avion Water Company. Deschutes River Conservancy, Deschtes Water
Alliance,
http://www.deschutesriver.org/What_We_Do/Partnerships/Deschutes_Water_Alliance/default.a
spx (last visited May 10, 2010). The Water Alliance Water Bank also acquires water rights
permanently and temporarily from irrigation districts for instream purposes apart from the
groundwater mitigation program in order to preserve agricultural water rights and contribute to
streamflow restoration. DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE, WATER BANK: BALANCING WATER
DEMAND IN THE DESCHUTES BASIN 1 (2008), http://www.deschutesriver.org/CEDocuments/
Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=323478&fd=0 (last visited June 4, 2010).
53. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Banking, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
What_We_Do/ Water_Banking/Water_Bank/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
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54

Basin must acquire mitigation credits to “offset the potential
interference with hydraulically connected surface waters caused by
55
ground water withdrawals within the Deschutes River Basin.” The
program was recently evaluated, demonstrating its overall
56
contribution to streamflow restoration. The DRC administers these
water banks in cooperation with local irrigation districts,
municipalities, landowners, and the Oregon Water Resources
57
Department.
The net result is that the DRC and the water banks have made
significant headway in meeting the Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife’s targets for stream flow on several priority creeks and rivers.
For instance, Whychus Creek historically dried up every summer, but
58
saw summer flows of 15 cfs in 2007, nearly meeting the 20 cfs target.
In the Middle Deschutes River, south of Bend, Oregon, the DRC’s
cooperative approach has raised flows from the historic low level of
30 cfs to 115 cfs in 2008, bringing it almost halfway to the 250 cfs
59
target.
3. Columbia Basin Water Transaction Program
The Northwest Power and Conservation Council (the “Council”)
developed a comprehensive Fish and Wildlife Program beginning in
60
1982 under the Northwest Power Act. In spite of its call for instream
flow restoration in the Columbia River Basin, very little water was
54. H.B. 2184, § 2 (Or. 2001) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 537.746 (2007)); see also H.B.
3494 (Or. 2005).
55. Id. § 2; see also, Martha O. Pagel, Creative Programs and Projects to Increas Water
Supply Mitigation and Mitigation Banking: Strategies for Meeting New Supply Needs in Oregon’s
Deschutes Basin, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 29 (2002-2003) (describing the development of the
regulatory program).
56. See OR. WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, DESCHUTES GROUNDWATER MITIGATION:
PROGRAM FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT (2008), available at http:/
www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/Deschutes_Mitigation_5_Year_Review_Final_Report.pdf.
57. See DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE, DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE WATER BANK:
BALANCING
WATER
DEMAND
IN
THE
DESCHUTES
BASIN
(2008),
http://
www.deschutesriver.org/CEDocuments/Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=323478&fd=0 (last visited
June 5, 2010).
58. Deschutes River Conservancy, Whychus Creek, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
Our_Basin/Upper_Deschutes/Whychus_Creek/default.aspx (last visited June 4, 2010).
59. See
Deschutes
River
Conservancy,
Middle
Deschutes
River
http://
www.deschutesriver.org/Our_Basin/Upper_Deschutes/Middle_Deschutes/default.aspx
(last
visited June 4, 2010).
60. See Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program Introduction, http://
www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-20/default.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); see also,
MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE
DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON (2002).
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acquired for the first 20 years of the program, even after many
Columbia Basin salmon were listed under the Endangered Species
61
Act. Recognizing the lack of success in streamflow restoration, in
2000, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Biological Opinion on
operation of the federal Columbia River hydroelectric system
specifically required the Bonneville Power Administration (“BPA”)
to increase tributary flows by experimenting with transactional
62
strategies and competitive markets.
In response, BPA and the Council formed the Columbia Basin
Water Transfer Program (“CBWTP”) in 2002, which has successfully
implemented a variety of innovative, voluntary, grassroots water
63
transactions that improve river, stream, and tributary flow.
The
program, managed by the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation,
receives transaction proposals and then evaluates and ranks them
64
across several criteria.
These projects come from specific
“qualified” local entities and eleven partner organizations working
throughout the Columbia Basin in Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and
65
Washington. The CBWTP has funded over 227 water restoration
66
projects to date.
4. Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust
The mission of the Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust (“KBRT”) is
to restore and conserve water quality and quantity in Oregon’s Wood

61. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE REINITIATION OF
CONSULTATION
ON OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE
JUVENILE FISH
TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM, AND 19 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE
COLUMBIA BASIN (2000).
62. Id. at 9-134.
63. Columbia Basin Water Transactions, The Program, http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/
program.jsp (last visited June 4, 2010).
64. See Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Criteria for Evaluating Proposals to
Secure Tributary Water, http://www.cbwtp.org/partners/Criteria_02_12_04.htm (last visited June
4, 2010).
65. Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Partners, http://www.cbwtp.org/
jsp/cbwtp/program/ partners.jsp (last visited June 4, 2010). Also, the Deschutes River
Conservancy and the Freshwater Trust are qualified local entities participating in the CBWTP.
66. JARED HARDNER & R.E. GULLISON, INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE
COLUMBIA BASIN WATER TRANSACTIONS PROGRAM (2003-2006) 10 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/program/2008amend/cbwtp.pdf (listing 153 water projects from
2003-2006); Nat’l Fish and Wildlife Found., Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program,
http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/query/select_fields.jsp (last visited May 13, 2010) (running
query creates database showing 246 water restoration projects).
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67

River Valley and the upper Klamath Basin. This organization has
specific goals of reducing cattle grazing to sustainable levels,
increasing flow into the Upper Klamath Lake, and reestablishing
68
specific wetlands in the area above the lake. KBRT works with 13
landowners in the Wood River Valley to pilot land-and-water69
management projects involving over 12,200 acres of rangeland.
Irrigation rights associated with the participating ranches are acquired
and left instream. This significantly increases flows in Crooked Creek,
the Wood River, Sevenmile Creek, and Fourmile Creek, to benefit
70
of a variety of endangered, threatened, and aquatic species.
Livestock herds on the participating properties were reduced by 80
71
percent relative to historic levels.
Increased flows to Upper
Klamath-Agency Lake also provide additional water to meet the
72
demands of downstream fish, wildlife, and farming communities.
The KBRT projects also provides significant water quality benefits
and a 30 percent increase of flow into the Wood River Valley and
73
Agency Lake.
The water left instream showed improvements in
quality—lower temperatures and reduced nutrient loads—and
riparian fencing allowed important riparian vegetation to
74
reestablish.
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the Natural
Resource Conservation Service fund the landowner’s water
acquisitions and water quality improvement practices directly based
75
upon the ecosystem services the landowners provide.
5. Bonneville Environmental Foundation
Regulation is not the only factor motivating purchasers of water
restoration credits. Individuals are often concerned about the impact
of their water use on the ecological health of their watershed. Some
refer to this as a desire to be “water neutral.” Extracting water

67. Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust, Mission Statement, http://www.kbrt.org (last visited
June 4, 2010).
68. Id.
69. KLAMATH BASIN RANGELAND TRUST, 2005 YEAR-IN-REVIEW 1 (2006), available at
http://www.kbrt.org/Files/KBRT%202005%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf.
70. Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust, Year 2-2003 Projects, http://www.kbrt.org/
Page.asp?NavID=116 (last visited June 5, 2010).
71. Id.
72. KLAMATH BASIN RANGELAND TRUST, 2006 YEAR-IN –REVIEW 2 (2007), available at
http://www.kbrt.org/Files/KBRT_Year-In-Review_2006%5B1%5D.pdf.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Klamation Basin Rangeland Trust, supra note 71.
75. See King, supra note 41 at 528 & n.159.
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neutrally means that its “negative economic, social, and
environmental externalities . . . are reduced as much as possible and
76
that the remaining impacts are fully compensated.” The Bonneville
Environmental Foundation (“BEF”) now provides resources to help
residential and commercial water users reduce their water use
77
78
footprints and develop water conservation and stewardship plans.
For water uses that users cannot reduce, BEF sells Water Restoration
79
Certificates. These certificates are designed to allow residents to
take responsibility for their water consumption by paying BEF to
assure that an equivalent amount of water is returned to the
80
watershed. Each certificate represents 1000 gallons of streamflow
81
restoration and costs one dollar. In Oregon, BEF uses the money
generated from selling these certificates to purchase restoration
credits from the Deschutes River Conservancy and The Freshwater
Trust for streamflow and watershed restoration in the Middle
82
Deschutes River and Evan’s Creek. The National Fish and Wildlife
83
Federation independently certifies these credits.
C. Water Quality
In the United States, water quality is primarily addressed
84
through the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). The Act’s regulatory focus
is on discharges from point-source conveyances into navigable
85
The program, known as the National Pollutant
waterways.

76. BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY AND MARKET-BASED
INITIATIVES IN FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 9 (2009), available at http://www.b-ef.org/lib/pdf/BAFInal.pdf (quoting ARJEN HOEKSTRA, WATER NEUTRAL: REDUCING AND
OFFSETTING THE IMPACTS OF WATER FOOTPRINTS 5 (UNESCO-IHE, 2008)).
77. Bonneville Envtl Found., Renewable Energy, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/action (last
visited June 6, 2010).
78. See BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., WATER STEWARDSHIP 101, 3–7 (2009), available at
http://www.b-e-f.org/lib/pdf/BusinessWaterStewardship.pdf.
79. Bonneville Envtl Found., Introducing BEF Water Restoration Certificates, http://
www.b-e-f.org/blog/?p=1256 (last visited June 8, 2010).
80. Id.
81. Bonneville Envtl Found., Buying Blue Will Help Keep You Green, http://www.b-ef.org/water/buy (last visited June 6, 2010).
82. See Bonneville Envtl Found., Where the Healing is Happening, http://www.b-ef.org/water/locations (last visited June 6, 2010); Bonneville Envtl Found., Middle Deschutes
River, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/location/middle_deschutes (last visited June 6, 2010);
Bonneville Envtl Found., Evans Creek, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/location/evans_creek (last
visited June 6, 2010).
83. BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., supra note 76, at 9.
84. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 347 (1981).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
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Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), requires all dischargers to
meet uniform technology standards mandated by the U.S.
86
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).
During the early years of CWA implementation, the technologyforcing requirements of NPDES permits were the EPA’s focus.
Water-quality standards were regarded as a safety net, in case
technology-based effluent standards in permits were not sufficient to
achieve designated beneficial uses. During the 1980s and 1990s states
began to identify waters where technology-based pollution controls
were insufficient to achieve the water bodies’ designated uses. This
requires development of Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”)
87
allocations under the Clean Water Act § 303(d). Once TMDLs are
adopted, NPDES permits must include more stringent limits to
88
ensure compliance with water quality.
However, in many cases, the reason water quality standards are
not met is due to agricultural and urban runoff and other non-point
89
sources of pollutants, which do not require NPDES permits. Critics
note that trying to achieve needed pollution reductions solely through
NPDES permit conditions does not improve water quality
90
efficiently. Within one watershed different polluters may be able to
reduce their discharges of a particular pollutant for very different
costs. If affordable pollution reduction were the CWA’s primary
goal, facilities with a higher marginal cost of pollution reduction could
easily purchase the lowest cost reductions in the watershed, no matter
the source.
Realizing the lack of flexibility inherent in the traditional
regulatory program, the EPA issued a “Draft Framework for
91
Watershed-Based Trading” in 1996. The EPA supplemented this
92
framework in 2003 with a “Water Quality Trading Policy” aimed at
reducing states’ costs of implementing TMDL requirements and

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b), 1316.
Id. at 589, 684-85.
Id. at 661, 665; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 647.
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED
TRADING, EPA 800-R-96-001 (May 1996).
92. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY (2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.pdf.
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allowing facilities discharging into the same waters to generate and
93
trade credits.
1. Clean Water Services
Clean Water Services (“CWS”) is the water resources
management agency for Washington County, Oregon, serving cities
94
CWS received the first-ever fully
and towns west of Portland.
95
integrated municipal NPDES permit on February 26, 2004. Five
permits—four wastewater treatment facilities and one urban
stormwater management permit—were combined into one permit in
a comprehensive approach to achieve water quality standards and to
96
improve the overall health of the Tualatin River watershed. The
new permit allowed trading of water quality credits based on
temperature (thermal load), oxygen-demanding chemicals, and other
97
pollutants to help achieve water quality goals. The goal of such
trading is to allow “1) greater coordination of watershed protection
and enhancement programs; 2) greater coordination of watershed
assessment and monitoring activities; and 3) greater public
98
involvement.” The trades do not have to rely on credits generated
by the permitted facilities; for instance, to meet temperature goals, a
treatment facility may balance the heat it releases by planting new
99
trees in rural riparian areas which provide cooling shade. The CWS
permit epitomizes the promise of ecosystem service markets. The
agency would have had to refrigerate its wastewater discharges to
meet the instream temperature standard. By investing in riparian
restoration, the agency saved money, reduced energy use and
100
achieved habitat restoration co-benefits.

93. Id. at 6–7.
94. Clean Water Serv., Your Clean Water Utility, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/
AboutUs/OurStory (last visited June 7, 2010).
95. INST. FOR NATURAL RES., POLICY CORNERSTONES AND ACTION STRATEGIES FOR AN
INTEGRATED ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE IN OREGON 6 (2008).
96. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION
SYSTEM WATERSHED-BASED WASTE DISCHARGE PERMIT, Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143,
101144 & MS4, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdescan/OR0028118FP.pdf.
97. Id. at 42–45.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id. at 27–28.
100. See ERNIE NIEMI, KRISTIN LEE, & TATIANA RATERMAN, NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS
OF USING ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION TO MEET STREAM TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS 2–3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.econw.com/reports/Economic-Benefits-EcosystemRestoration_ECONorthwest.pdf.
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The successes of CWS helped set the stage for further focus on
water quality trading. In 2007, the EPA issued its own water quality
“trading toolkit” manual explaining how to design and implement
101
water quality trading schemes.
The Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality (“ODEQ”) has also proposed new guidance
102
to encourage and expand water quality trading.
Because warm
streams are a limiting factor for salmon recovery, ODEQ has also
created the “Shade-a-Lator” worksheet. This calculates temperature
credits generated by riparian shade restoration, allowing sellers of
ecosystem services to create tradable temperature credits at lower
103
costs.
D. Land Banking for Wetlands and Habitat
Land development over centuries has significantly reduced fish
and wildlife habitat. Traditional land trusts, like The Nature
Conservancy, pioneered the practice of acquiring land to protect its
biodiversity value.
Two federal statutes touch directly upon
ecologically valuable lands: wetlands are governed by CWA and its
104
regulations, and modification to some terrestrial habitats are
105
protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). In response
to the costly restrictions these acts can impose, markets for mitigation
credits have begun to develop. These markets—or banks—sell
credits to developers to mitigate for the impacts their projects have
on wetlands or endangered species habitat. This type of land banking
attempts to convert ecological functions to a tradable currency, so
that restoration in one area can generate mitigation credits that can
be applied to other locations or sold to developers.

101. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT
WRITERS (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit.pdf. The toolkit
and its suppliment cite Clean Water Services’ pollutant trading scheme as a model example
several times.
102. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY TRADING IN NPDES PERMITS
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 13–14 (2009), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/
WQ/pubs/imds/wqtrading.pdf.
103. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality Trading, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/
trading/trading.htm (last visited June 6, 2010); Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality:
Temperature,
willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/water-quality-temperature (last visited
June 6, 2010).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230, 232 (2009).
105. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
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1. Wetlands Mitigation Banking
Wetlands provide many services to humans, including water
retention, soil formation, recreation, erosion control, nutrient cycling,
pollination of crops, and endangered species habitat. In the
continental United States, more than half of the historically existing
wetlands have been drained, filled, or destroyed by agriculture, urban
106
and rural development, and river and flood control projects.
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the U.S. Army Corps
107
of Engineers (“the Corps”) to issue permits allowing wetland filling.
Since 1990, the EPA and the Corps have required “no net loss” of
108
wetland acreage. To meet this goal, developers are required to first
avoid filling wetlands and then to minimize its effects. Only
unavoidable effects can be mitigated through wetland restoration in
109
the area.
After limited success through project-by-project, on-site
compensatory mitigation, in 1995 the federal agencies began allowing
110
banking of wetlands mitigation credits.
These regulations under
section 404(b)(1) allow for “compensatory mitigation to offset
111
unavoidable damage to wetlands and other aquatic resources.” This
guidance gave state agencies, local governments, and the private
sector the regulatory certainty and procedural framework they
112
needed to approve and operate mitigation banks.
Trading in wetlands banks soon became robust, making wetland
banks the most mature form of habitat banking. In wetland
mitigation banks, by restoring the values of a wetland, the landowner
generates credits that they can sell to developers who need to offset
113
unavoidable wetland impacts.
But these trades often rely on safe
havens based on simple acre-to-acre mitigation ratios that ignore
114
While
preserving the functions that make wetlands valuable.
106. PAUL F. SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS
10–13 (1997).
107. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
108. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONCERNING
THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1)
GUIDELINES § IIIB (1990).
109. Id at § II C.
110. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. 58605 (Nov. 28, 1995).
111. Id. at 58606.
112. Id. at 58605–14.
113. See id at 58606..
114. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 138-68 (2001) (analyzing strengths and weaknesses of ongoing
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wetlands provide a variety of ecological services, the early use of
115
wetland markets relied upon very few of these.
The EPA and the Corps have the authority to allow the
exchange and banking of wetlands services, rather than mere
116
acreages.
In 2008, EPA and the Corps issued revised regulations
117
These regulations establish
governing compensatory mitigation.
standards for mitigation banks, in-lieu fee mitigation, and permittee118
responsible mitigation.
Oregon’s Department of State Lands (“ODSL”) issues fill and
119
removal permits for wetlands under state law.
The Corps
administers the federal 404 program in Oregon, but in many cases the
120
ODSL adopted guidelines similar
agencies operate cooperatively.
121
to the federal guidelines in 1996.
The Corps and ODSL oversee
bank plans and release credits to wetlands bankers only after bank
owners meet performance measures and arrange to fund, maintain,
122
manage, and monitor the wetlands in perpetuity. ODSL encourages
potential bank owners to establish mitigation banks in watersheds
where there is a large amount of development activity, “so that it is
positioned to provide ‘in-kind’ mitigation for these anticipated
123
wetland impacts.”
Such preferred bank sites assure that bank
owners are preserving wetlands of the same type, function, and
service area as those in the path of development in the region. Good
locations for banks are sites adjacent or close to other protected
natural-habitat areas such as refuges, river corridors, and floodplains
mitigation projects and recommending, inter alia, a watershed approach, focusing on ecological
performance criteria, better accounting for temporal lags and long term obligations); James
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 607, 665-66 (2000).
115. Id. at 612.
116. See J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental
Law: A Case Study of Wetland Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 372–78 (2001)
(finding that CWA § 404 and subsequent regulations and guidelines all provide ample authority
and encouragement for considering ecosystem services but fail to require it).
117. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594 (April
10, 2008).
118. See id.
119. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 196.600–692., 196.800–990.
120. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Oregon Removal-Fill Program, http://www.oregon.gov/
DSL/PERMITS/r-fintro.shtml (last visited June 8, 2010).
121. OR. ADMIN. R. 141-085-0680–0760 (2010).
122. See MITIGATION BANKING GUIDEBOOK COMM., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING
GUIDEBOOK FOR OREGON § 4.4 – 5 (2000), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/
docs/mitbank_guidebk.pdf.
123. Id. at § 2.4.
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124

where they will create the least conflict with existing uses. Oregon
125
currently has 15 approved wetland mitigation banks, with an
126
additional seven proposed banks under review.
2. Oregon Bridge Program Comprehensive Mitigation and
Conservation Strategy
Roads and highways shape our communities and link us together;
however, they slice natural systems into pieces, destroying habitat and
127
disrupting a wide array of ecosystem services. State departments of
transportation must comply with a wide variety of environmental laws
and regulations when they build, maintain and operate state highway
systems.
Since at least 1990, the Oregon Department of
Transportation (“ODOT”) has tried to streamline highway project
permitting and reduce costs while effectively mitigating unavoidable
wetland impacts, facilitating priority ecological restoration and
species recovery, creating ecologically sound and sustainable
128
mitigation, and conserving resources.
From 2001 to 2003, ODOT realized that hundreds of its concrete
bridges had developed cracks, requiring them to be replaced or
129
repaired.
This resulted in the $1.3 billion Bridge Delivery
130
131
Upgrading and repairing 300 bridges in eight years
Program.
132
requires permits under the Endangered Species Act, the Clean

124. OR. ADMIN. R. 141-085-0565 (2010).
125. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Mitigation Bank Regions and Contact Information,
http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/mitbank_status.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
126. Id.
127. See generally RICHARD T.T. FORMAN ET AL, ROAD ECOLOGY: SCIENCE AND
SOLUTIONS (2003); DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, GETTING UP TO SPEED: A CONSERVATIONIST’S
GUIDE TO WILDLIFE AND HIGHWAYS (2007).
128. LISA GAINES & SUSAN LURIE, INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING
AND PROJECT DELIVERY: THE OREGON STATE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM 3, 27, SR 500151 (2007), available at http://www.inr.oregonstate.edu/download/Streamlining_Jan07.pdf
(briefly discussing Oregon’s Comprehensive Environmental and Transportation Agreement on
Streamlining, an 11-state-and-federal-agency program designed to streamline NEPA review);
see also CONNIE OZAWA & JENNIFER DILL, AN EVALUATION OF THE OREGON DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION'S (ODOT) ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING EFFORTS: A FOCUS ON
CETAS (2005).
129. See GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 11.
3
130. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONTEXT SENSITIVE AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS (CS )
GUIDEBOOK: COMMUNITY VALUES SHAPING A NEW GENERATION OF BRIDGES 2 (2005),
available at http://www.obdp.org/files/partner/cs3/cs3-guidebook.pdf.
131. Or. Dep’t of Transp., OTIA III State Bridge Delivery Program, http://egov.oregon.gov/
ODOT/HWY/OTIA/odotbridgesee_regs.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
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133

Water Act, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy
134
This project put the agency’s prior work on permit
Act.
streamlining to the test. ODOT and the regulatory agencies realized
that business as usual would not work.
To speed up permitting and improve environmental outcomes,
ODOT developed a “comprehensive mitigation-banking program” to
135
provide mitigation credits for unavoidable construction impacts. To
minimize impacts first, ODOT developed a set of environmental
performance standards addressing species and habitat avoidance,
136
water quality, and site restoration. For unavoidable impacts, most
mitigation programs explicitly prefer on-site mitigation, even though
such mitigation is often difficult to develop, expensive, and may be of
137
little long-term ecological value.
In this case, however, the
Mitigation and Conservation Bank Review Team (“MCBRT”), made
138
up of representatives from eight state and federal agencies, instead
decides where mitigation will be most effective on a site-by-site
139
basis.
Unlike many wetland banking programs based on pure acre-foracre “no net loss” mitigation, the MCBRT targets the recovery of
140
ecosystems and lost habitat functions. The programmatic Biological
Opinion issued to ODOT in 2004 for the Bridge Program explains
how ODOT plans to use “habitat banking concepts” in habitat
141
management areas. Development approval relies upon on a “multi-

133.
134.
135.
136.

33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
Or. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 131.
GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 19–20, app. A-2; OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OTIA III
STATE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 14–30
(2005), available at http://www.obdp.org/files/partner/environmental/EPS_REG.pdf.
137. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 894–96, 895 n.17
(1997).
138. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 31.
139. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRANSPORTATION
AGREEMENT FOR STREAMLINING: PROGRESS REPORT—AUGUST 2007 TO AUGUST 2008
APPROVED WORK PLAN—SEPTEMBER 2008 TO SEPTEMBER 2010, at 21 (2008), available at
ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/GeoEnvironmental/Environmental/Other Enviromental Materials/CETAS/Annual Reports and Wo
rk Plans/2008_2010_Workplan/CETAS_2008-2010_Work_Plan_AdoptedFinal.pdf.
140. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 130, at 52; GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 20.
141. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA
FISHERIES NWR 2004/00209 & USFWS FILE #8330.02233 (04), ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, INFORMAL CONCURRENCE AND FORMAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION
AND CONFERENCE & MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT: ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT CONSULTATION, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
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142

resource mitigation debit and credit system.”
Prioritization of
ecosystem conservation needs helped identify regionally significant
mitigation alternatives that contribute most to the recovery of
habitats and species. ODOT has been able to achieve cost-effective
and ecologically meaningful mitigation by addressing these needs at
143
ODOT bank sites.
“The Habitat Accounting Method helps to
accurately measure ecological functions providing better accounting
144
The MCBRT has established
of impacts and restoration efforts.”
three banks for wetlands and endangered species habitat in the Lost
River, Crooked River, and Medford Vernal Pools in the Agate
145
Desert. It has also identified two other potential bank locations in
146
Mirror Lake and East Fork Minnow Creek.
An independent evaluation of ODOT’s use of wetlands and
habitat banks, as well as outcome-based performance measures, in
the Bridge Program concluded that it led to a 3:1 return on
investment for the agency, in addition to improved environmental
147
outcomes.
E. Integrated Ecosystem Services Marketplace
The goal of building an integrated ecosystem marketplace is to
attain broader and more effective conservation and restoration,
rather than the fragmented permit-by-permit approach required by
existing laws and regulations requiring separate credits for carbon,
streamflow, water quality and habitat.
Integrated market
development will require a new suite of tools tied to strategic
ecological priorities and market-based incentives. The thesis is that

TRANSPORTATION’S OTIA III STATEWIDE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM 36 (Jun. 28, 2004),
available
at
ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/GeoEnvironmental/Environmental/Regulatory%20Documentation%20Forms%20and%20Example
s/Biology/Programmatic%20Biological%20Opinions/OTIA%20III%20Bridge%20Replacemen
t%20Biological%20Assessment/Biological%20Opinion.pdf.
142. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 20–21.
143. Id. at 44–46.
144. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Oregon's Ecosystem-Based Approach to Mitigation and
Conservation Banking, http://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/ecosystems/eei/or06.asp (last
visited May 18, 2010).
145. Id; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Oregon’s First Conservation Bank, http://www.fws.gov/
oregonFWO/LandAndWater/ConservationPlanning/ConservationBank.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2010).
146. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 139, at 23–24.
147. OR. DEP’T OF TRANS., ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMATIC PERMITTING
BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS (Oct. 2008) (on file with the authors).
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the more readily ecological services can be assessed, the more readily
they can be valued and protected.
1. Willamette Partnership
In addition to the individual Oregon resource programs
described above, the Willamette Partnership is working to build the
infrastructure to operate an integrated, multi-credit market that will
148
create and sell credits for a wide range of ecosystem services. The
Willamette Partnership is a broad-based coalition of stakeholders
committed to restoring the health of the ecologically, socially, and
economically complex Willamette Valley. This 11,500 square mile
watershed contains the cities of Portland, Eugene, Salem, and
Corvallis, 2.5 million people, and 75 percent of Oregon’s economic
149
activity. The Willamette Partnership recognized the need for a
coordinated approach that focuses public and private investments on
strategic actions that support ecosystem-based improvements. To
address this need, it launched the “Counting on the Environment”
150
program with Natural Resource and Conservation Service funding.
The program seeks to encourage participation in market-based
conservation efforts by developing model agreements with federal,
151
state, and local agencies; user-friendly resource calculating tools ;
multiple-credit accounting systems; and understandable crediting
152
protocols. These systems are designed to provide the infrastructure
needed to support multi-resource credit sales. The ecosystem service
markets developed so far support four credit types—salmonid
habitat, wetlands, upland prairies, and riparian shading (temperature

148. See
Willamette
P’ship,
The
Willamette
Partnership,
http://
www.willamettepartnership.org (last visited June 6, 2010).
149. Willamette P’ship, About the Willamette Basin, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
about-the-willamette-basin (last visited June 6, 2010).
150. Nat. Resources Conservation Serv., Conservation Innovation Grants Awards—
National Component Awards—Fiscal Year 2007 (NRCS), available at http://
www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/pdf_files/FY_2007_Conservation_Innovation_Grants_Projects.pdf
; Willamette P’ship, Counting on the Environment, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
ongoing-projects-and-activities/nrcs-conservation-innovations-grant-1/counting-on-the-environ
ment (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
151. Willamette P’ship, Ecosystem Credit Accounting, http://willamettepartnership.org/
ecosystem-credit-accounting (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); Willamette P’ship, Protocols, Tools and
Templates, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/tools-templates (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
152. See generally, WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ECOSYSTEM CREDIT ACCOUNTING: PILOT
GENERAL CREDITING PROTOCOL: WILLAMETTE BASIN VERSION 1.1 (2009), available at http://
willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/willamette-ecosystem-marketplacedocuments/General%20Crediting%20Protocol%207.20.09.pdf.
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credits)—with more credits to be developed later. The Willamette
Partnership expects these tools to improve the ecological
effectiveness of mitigation expenditures from factories, developers,
154
transportation agencies, cities, and sewer and water ratepayers. The
current lack of well-organized markets also inhibits the conservation
options for farmers, ranchers, and landowners. With a functioning
market for services, they could provide additional ecosystem services
on their lands, diversifying and increasing their incomes through
conservation investments. Because it is integrated and will involve
many types of credits—and many types of buyers and sellers—this
developing ecosystem marketplace should expect to create and drive
restoration projects that are more comprehensive than any one party
155
or exchange can accomplish alone. No other markets, nationally or
internationally, have attempted to be as comprehensive, integrated,
and ecosystem-focused as the Willamette Ecosystem Marketplace.
It is one thing to develop the theoretical constructs and plans for
an ecosystem market, but the Willamette Partnership is working to
ensure that state and federal agencies will independently approve and
156
verify owners’ credits.
Currently, pilot projects using these
157
guidelines and credits are under development.
2. The Freshwater Trust
In addition to restoring streamflows as described above, The
Freshwater Trust has developed the StreamBank program, a “web
tool that enables landowners and restoration professionals to
158
efficiently permit and fund a restoration project.” It aims to lower
transaction costs by helping potentially shovel-ready restoration

153. See id. at 1.
154. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ORGANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLIMENTATION OF
THE
WILLAMETTE
ECOSYSTEM
MARKETPLACE
1–2,
available
at
http://
willamettepartnership.org/publications/MarketplacePubs/OrganizingDevelopmentandImpleme
ntationoftheWillamet....pdf.
155. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, DEVELOPING THE WILLAMETTE ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 15
(2008).
156. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, supra note 152, at 21–24.
157. Willamette P’ship, Pilot Projects, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystemcredit-accounting/pilot-projects (last visited June 6, 2010).
158. FRESHWATER TRUST, CASE STUDY 2008: STREAMBANK: RESTORATION SIMPLIFIED 4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.thefreshwatertrust.org/sites/thefreshwatertrust.org/files/pdf/StreamBank%20Case%
20Study%202008%20-%20Low%20Res.pdf.
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projects find government funding and overcome regulatory hurdles.
It requires restoration professionals to answer a series of projectspecific questions, which StreamBank then matches with a “sciencebased prioritization scheme” and criteria for agency and private
160
funding sources. The web tool can also generate a budget and fill
161
out permitting forms. Once a project is underway, the StreamBank
162
program helps fund monitoring and reporting. In 2007, three pilot
projects were processed in this system with another 17 initiated in
163
2008. By creating such efficiencies, the Freshwater Trust should be
able to meet more demand and at lower costs to both providers and
purchasers of mitigation projects.
III. LESSONS LEARNED
A. Market Development Requires Experimentation
In science, experimentation begins with a hypothesis, followed by
controlled situations that can measure the effect of one variable on
another. In the realm of policy development, experimentation often
takes the form of pilot projects. In the previous section, we discussed
a variety of Oregon market experiments for carbon dioxide, water
quantity, water quality, and land. While each example teaches us
something new about structuring ecosystem markets, the greatest
lesson may be recognition of the value of experimentation in
developing fully functioning markets. Oregon is a fairly small state
which makes it a good testing laboratory where people can and do
learn from one another. Market experiments can demonstrate
technical, social and political feasibility. Theories that a project will
restore ecological services, that creating markets will maximize
ecological gains for the lowest economic costs, or that buyers and
sellers will actually enter new markets, require confirmation before
they can be expanded. Experiments demonstrate whether projects
will or will not be feasible in practice.

159. Id. at 6 (reporting on a survey that found “26% of restoration professionals’ workdays
are spent securing permits or funding”).
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 8, 11–24 (overview and details of 2008 projects).
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1. Developing Supply and Demand
Markets cannot exist without willing buyers and sellers.
Successful pilot projects can generate sufficient supply and demand to
build markets, both for the specific currency traded and for the use of
ecosystem service markets generally. Potential sellers of ecosystem
services are land and resource owners, farmers, and even
conservation organizations that generate credits by conserving,
164
restoring, or creating ecosystem goods on their lands.
Potential
buyers of ecosystem services can be regulated entities required to
offset unavoidable ecological damages, voluntary buyers who want to
invest in environmental restoration in high priority areas, or
governments purchasing credits to support cost-effective
165
conservation.
If an ecosystem market generates revenue for sellers, it
encourages other sellers to enter the market and grow markets with
credit-generating potential. For new suppliers to enter the market,
they must not only see the potential for economic gains, they must
also be convinced that transaction costs of financing, permitting and
legal uncertainty do not outweigh the benefits. Even if they value
conservation, only demonstrable, long-term, stable, and certain
rewards will encourage landowners to encumber their land with longterm commitments. This was the problem with the DRC/Climate
Trust Riparian Reforestation Project. The Climate Trust and the
DRC expected to be able to create and sell $780,000 in carbon offsets
through a riparian reforestation project when they began the project
166
167
in 2002. By 2008, only $233,333 of credits had been sold. Many
private landowners were unwilling to sign 50-year conservation
168
easements for the restored riparian areas.
The Climate Trust was able to build carbon-offset markets in
Oregon and elsewhere by using the Oregon statutory offset mandate
169
to provide start-up funds. This allowed it to hire the staff needed to

164. Willamette P’ship, Sellers: Who Are They?, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
key-marketplace-participants/sellers-of-ecosystem-services (last visited June 6, 2010).
165. Willamette P’ship, Buyers: Who are they?, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
key-marketplace-participants/buyers-of-ecosystem-services (last visited June 6, 2010).
166. Press Release, Climate Trust et al., The Climate Trust Awards Contract to the
Deschutes Resources Conservancy to Capture Atmospheric Carbon through Riparian
Reforestation
(Aug.
7,
2002),
available
at
http://www.climatetrust.org/
pdfs/The%20Climate%20Trust-Deschutes%20Press%20Release.pdf.
167. The Climate Trust, supra note 16.
168. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003.
169. See supra notes 15–16 and associated text.
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170

buy carbon offsets and participate in international carbon markets.
They expanded the market by reaching beyond companies required
to buy offsets for their Oregon power plants to others who voluntarily
wanted to offset their carbon emissions, expanding the demand for
171
the credits.
Bonneville Environmental Foundation has built its
portfolio by promoting voluntary purchases of ecosystem services,
first by selling consumers “Green Tags” alongside products that
172
would fund renewable energy and more recently by selling water
173
restoration certificates.
The DRC started its market-based
streamflow restoration work by investing its limited federal funds to
buy or lease water for instream use from willing sellers, only later
developing water banks to meet groundwater mitigation
174
requirements.
In each of these cases, non-profit organizations
started markets by purchasing ecosystem services from willing sellers
to create the demand necessary to stimulate landowners to become
sellers and suppliers of ecosystem credits.
Oregon’s experiments in ecosystem service markets demonstrate
175
the importance of early adopters in the diffusion of innovation.
Clean Water Services is a large municipal wastewater and stormwater
176
agency with a strong technical and policy staff.
Its board is the
177
elected county commission. Its longtime general manager served on
the board of the Willamette Partnership and other basin-wide

170. See Climate Trust, supra note 15 (showing Climate Trust’s history); Climate Trust,
Offset Quality Initiative & National Policy, http://www.climatetrust.org/oqi_national.html (last
visited June 8, 2010).
171. See CLIMATE TRUST, CUSTOMIZED VOLUNTARY OFFSET PROGRAMS, available at
http://www.climatetrust.org/documents/REV.9crxBUSINESSFLYER.pdf;
Climate
Trust,
Voluntary Offset Work, http://www.climatetrust.org/voluntaryOP.html (last visited June 8,
2010).
172. See BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., GREEN TAGS—A NEW WAY TO MARKET
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
11
(2004),
available
at
http://www.b-ef.org/lib/pdf/BEF_new_re_product.pdf (reporting BEF’s first Green Tag transaction began in
2000).
173. Bonneville Envtl. Found., Introducing BEF Water Restoration Certificates (Jul. 29,
2009), http://www.b-e-f.org/blog/?p=1256 (last visited June 8, 2010) (announcing start of water
restoration certificates in July 2009).
174. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003.
175. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1962).
176. Clean Water Servs., Departments, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/AboutUs/
Departments/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010); Clean Water Servs., Your Clean Water
Utility, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/AboutUs/OurStory/default.aspx (last visited June 6,
2010).
177. Clean Water Servs., Your Clean Water Utility, supra note 176; Washington County
Ore., Board of Commissioners, http://www.co.washington.or.us/BOC/ (last visited June 6, 2010).
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restoration initiatives. It had the resources and patience to pursue a
new integrated NPDES permit, serving now as a model for similarly
179
situated organizations. In the Klamath Basin, it was only after the
founders of the KBRT demonstrated on their own property that they
could reduce irrigation, change grazing practices, and stay in business
180
that other landowners were willing to sign up for the program. The
DRC took several years to move beyond small, voluntary water
leasing programs to robust water banking after landowners realized
they could help restore streamflows and still have sufficient water to
181
grow crops and operate irrigation districts.
Market experimentation can also build supply and demand by
demonstrating economic feasibility. Economic feasibility concerns
the cost-benefit analysis of each restoration or conservation project.
Pilot projects create opportunities for credit-generating banks and
land managers to invest in conservation and to demonstrate whether
their financial projections were accurate, thereby improving the
financial certainty for future projects. One of The Climate Trust’s
first carbon projects involved paying the City of Portland to establish
182
a website for commuters to arrange their own carpools.
While it
clearly appeared to The Climate Trust to be a promising venture,
after they spent $120,000, expecting to offset 70,000 metric tons of
carbon dioxide over ten years, the project generated only 3,075 tons
183
of reductions in the first five years. This was not a failure of science,
but an estimation failure of the demand for carpooling and the costs
of overcoming the public’s lack of enthusiasm for the service.
Whether it was a result of a miscalculation or over-exuberance, it is
unlikely that The Climate Trust will soon repeat such a risky and
uncertain investment.

178. Willamette P’ship, Board of Directors and Staff, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
about-us/board-of-directors-and-staff (last visited June 6, 2010).
179. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
180. Staff Report to KBRT Advisory Board, Fort Klamath, Oregon (2002).
181. Deschutes River Conservancy, Accomplishments, http://www.deschutesriver.org/
About_Us/Accomplishments/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010) (showing water transfers,
conservation, and leases accelerating in 2002, fully six years after DRC’s founding).
182. Climate Trust, Internet-Based Carpool Matching, http://www.climatetrust.org/
carpool_match.html
(last
visited
June
6,
2010);
CarpoolMatchNW,
http://
www.carpoolmatchnw.org (last visited June 6, 2010).
183. TODD WYNN, CASCADE POLICY INST., MONEY FOR NOTHING: THE ILLUSION OF
CARBON OFFSETS 18–20 (2009), available at http://www.cascadepolicy.org/pdf/env/
Climate_Trust_Audit_021009.pdf.
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Publicized successes with experimental markets increase
acceptance for markets providing ecosystem services, increasing the
likelihood that buyers, sellers, and the public will demand policies
that include valuing and paying for ecosystem services. All of the
organizations in Oregon that are working to develop ecosystem
markets make a point to publicize their work so that potential buyers
and sellers are aware of the opportunities markets provide. Effective
methods range from the webinars on new requests for proposals
hosted by The Climate Trust to tried-and-true field trips hosted by
KBRT, the Freshwater Trust, and the DRC.
Pilot projects also produce educational opportunities to inform
the public about the value of ecosystem services. If through these
experiments conservationists and governments can emphasize the
many ways nature sustains and enriches well-being, conservation may
184
be more broadly supported.
When minimizing and mitigating
impacts on ecological services and using best ecological practices in
land management are viewed as moral imperatives and mutually
beneficial activates, rather than regulatory requirements and tradeoffs between environmental and economic or social needs, then
buying and selling ecological services may be pursued more broadly.
2. Building Institutional Capacity
Markets require certain fundamentals to function, such as
recognized property rights to exchange, a legal ability to transfer the
property rights, accounting systems and market makers (the people or
entities that bring buyers and sellers together). Oregon’s experiments
in developing ecosystem service markets have benefited enormously
from the non-profit entities described above. The Climate Trust,
EcoTrust, BEF, KBRT, OWT, and the DRC have all advocated for
laws and policies needed for markets and served as market makers.
The first requirement for any market is that the “good” being
bought and sold be recognized as a property interest that can be
transferred. The OWT and the DRC could not invest in streamflow
restoration until Oregon state law was changed in 1987 to recognize
instream water rights and allow traditional surface water rights to be
185
acquired and transferred to instream use.
The Climate Trust and
Ecotrust had to define what counted as a carbon offset for their
purposes in a way that comported with a variety of young and
184. Paul R. Armsworth et al., Ecosystem Service Science and the Way Forward for
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1383, 1383 (2007).
185. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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evolving requirements.
The credit or property interest being
exchanged also needs to fit the particular marketplace. For example,
when the OWT and the CBWTP started to acquire water rights for
instream flow restoration, they initially tried to transfer irrigation
rights permanently to instream use. Farmers and ranchers generally
were unwilling to make permanent transfers. The markets only really
grew when OWT and others began leasing water rights for fixed
187
terms.
Excitement about creating more efficient mechanisms to reach
environmental goals is often restrained by legal barriers. Often, once
legislatures enact laws, administrators enact policies, and bureaucrats
enact procedures, ossification takes place until the “processes begin
188
taking on the same import as the law.” Federal and state regulatory
agencies have had to develop clear guidance defining mitigation
credits under the CWA and the ESA. This is illustrated by the CWS
189
experience (under the CWA) and ODOT’s experience (with habitat
190
mitigation banks).
Experimenting with markets may uncover
previously unimagined flexibility in the law and assuage fears of
potentially expensive regulatory delays and legal challenges. CWS,
through its persistent work with the ODEQ and EPA, developed a
way to meet water quality-based effluent limitations through a
191
watershed-based NPDES permit.
Market experiments should point out where further legal or
regulatory changes are necessary to promote functioning ecosystem
service markets.
Experimentation can demonstrate that
administrators are open to changing rigid processes to encourage
flexible, outcome-based solutions, as was the case with the Oregon
Bridge Program.
Experimentation may also demonstrate to
regulated industries and landowners how to cooperate to achieve

186. See CLARK S. BINKLEY ET AL., AN ECOSYSTEM-BASED FORESTRY INVESTMENT
STRATEGY FOR THE COASTAL TEMPERATE RAINFORESTS OF NORTH AMERICA 14 (2006),
available at http://www.ecotrust.org/forestry/investment_strategy.pdf (acknowledging Ecosystem
Forest Management will need to comply with a variety of standards, including those developed
by the Climate Trust).
187. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003.
188. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 29.
189. See supra Part II.C.1.
190. See supra Part II.D.2.
191. See DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION
SYSTEM WATERSHED-BASED WASTE DISCHARGE PERMIT, Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143,
101144 & MS4, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdescan/OR0028118FP.pdf.
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environmental goals at lower costs, bringing supply and demand to
the market.
The Oregon and Pacific Northwest non-profits have all provided
extensive technical assistance to both buyers and sellers of ecosystem
credits, helping them understand what carbon offsets or mitigation
credits or instream water rights are and how they can participate in
markets. To some extent, they work like real estate agents, linking
sellers and buyers, helping sellers develop transferable credits and
providing buyers the assurance that they are getting what they pay
for. The Freshwater Trust’s Streambank system provides direct
192
technical decision support to both buyers and sellers. All of these
organizations work with buyers and sellers to take transactions
through the wide variety of funding and permitting steps necessary to
do transactions. This experience is vital for market building because
it is only by doing transactions that buyers, sellers and market makers
gain assurance that the market works.
3. Building Learning Networks
In Oregon and the Pacific Northwest, hundreds of citizens,
agency personnel, businesses, and non-profits regularly get together
and share what they have learned about ecosystem service markets.
The best example of this is the well-organized group of qualified local
193
organizations participating in the CBWTP.
They meet together
quarterly to share best practices and data and study projects on the
ground. The Willamette Partnership played a similar role as it
engaged a broad variety of stakeholders in the development of its
194
integrated water market.
The Northwest Environmental Business
195
Council regularly hosts conferences and workshops on ecosystem
service markets. Innovation theory emphasizes the importance of
such learning networks or communities, and experience to date in
196
Oregon bears it out. Key individuals and opinion leaders, who see

192. See generally, FRESHWATER TRUST, supra note 158 (showing benefits through a series
of casestudies to sellers, e.g. landowners and restoration professionals, and buyers, e.g. local
coordinators and grant administrators).
193. Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Partners, supra note 65 (identifying 11
qualified local entities in Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho).
194. Willamette
P’ship,
Broad
Participation,
Broad
Benefits,
http://
www.willamettepartnership.org/key-marketplace-participants (last visited June 6, 2010).
195. Northwest Environmental Business Council, http://www.nebc.org (last visited June 4,
2010).
196. See ROGERS, supra note 175.
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how carbon and instream water markets work, promote market
approaches to habitat and other ecosystem services.
B. Market Development Requires Standards
It is essential to clearly and neutrally identify and quantify
relationships (1) between development actions and required
mitigation or offsets, and (2) between private sector landowners’
restoration measures and the ecosystem services provided.
Developing such standards for supply and demand requires advanced
technical capabilities. First, baselines are needed to determine what
services are provided under existing land management practices.
Measuring environmental degradation and the debits that must be
compensated may be relatively straightforward. The modeling and
predictive ability needed to accurately develop and certify a seller’s
ecosystem credits is more challenging. Ecosystem service sellers will
not manage their valuable lands for environmental services if they
cannot be assured that they will receive credits, and the public
interest of the trade will be lost if the ecosystem services promised do
not materialize. Poor outcomes are also likely to erode public
support for future efforts. Pilot projects, like those currently
underway with the Willamette Partnership, are important to show
scientific feasibility.
Without a technical underpinning for the market, negotiations,
auctions, and trading platforms cannot begin. Because much of this
technical knowledge and information technology infrastructure will
serve both voluntary and regulatory markets, this is an important area
for public-private partnership on financing, design and development.
1. Clear Property Interests
Experimental markets should address whether markets can
effectively identify and commoditize ecosystem services.
Are
tradable ecosystem “currencies” adequately defined? Developing
measurements, definitions, and procedures should help buyers and
sellers understand these currencies and their risks and responsibilities
before and after a sale. Such process manuals, currency development,
and ecosystem measurement tools are a large aspect of the
Willamette Partnership’s nascent “Counting on the Environment”
197
program.
Analyzing their success in developing currencies can
begin once pilot projects are underway.

197. See supra note 150 and text accompanying notes 150–155.

Achterman_final_2.doc

Summer 2010]

7/17/2010 12:24:09 PM

STATE AND REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS

321

2. Quantification and Valuation
Experimental markets should also demonstrate whether markets
mechanisms are functioning, i.e., is the interaction of supply and
198
demand adequately reflected in prices?
There is no question that
ecosystems generate service flows that can be quantified in economic
value; what is less clear is how to create markets that will generate
information about how much of a service needs to be protected and at
199
what cost. In some markets that will be easier to determine than in
others. In cap-and-trade greenhouse gas markets, the government can
set the amount of carbon dioxide reduction necessary and then
200
auction units of carbon pollution to the regulated market place.
The market is large with considerable supply and demand.
In water markets, water rights are held by a limited number of
entities and can only be traded within a particular watershed,
resulting in much less supply and demand and far fewer transactions.
Early on, the OWT and the DRC developed systems for evaluating
existing water rights’ ability to restore instream flows at times and
201
locations critical for aquatic habitat.
These evaluations were
essential for early water market development. On paper, an existing
water right may be for 5 cfs during the irrigation season, but it might
not be delivered for that full amount during critical low water
202
periods.
They now have analytic tools to determine for specific
203
rivers the values of how “wet” the waterway really is.
Early wetland mitigation banks overlooked the fact that wetland
values can only be traded fairly once the currency’s dimensions are
defined: which functions must mitigation replace, at what scale, in
what locations, and for whose benefit? Requiring wetland mitigation
to match destroyed wetlands along numerous specific variables will
198. See, e.g., James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001) (discussing
the lack of “direct price mechanisms to signal the scarcity or degradation of . . . public goods” in
a typical commercial market).
199. Salzman, supra note 137, at 889.
200. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 8, at 627–28 (explaining specifically the Kyoto Protocol
Clean Development Mechanism).
201. See Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading Into the Water Market: The First
Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 135, 162–64 (1999) (explaining
OWT’s development of measurement protocols and tools).
202. See, e.g., id. at 164–65 (“[N]eighboring water users are very wary of any transaction that
simply leaves the entire amount of a water user’s right in the stream, because doing so will
disrupt the established pattern of diversions and return flows and possibly deprive other
irrigators of flows in the stream at certain times of year.”).
203. See id. at 162–64.
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increase sellers’ and buyers’ assessment and monitoring costs and
204
decrease the number of sellers who can match those functions. A
prerequisite of trade is fungibility, and fungibility requires
205
similarity.
If trades do not capture the environmental and human
values sought to be protected, those values become external to the
206
exchange and cannot be assured by trading mechanisms.
Consequently, wetlands regulators need to choose a defensible point
along the spectrum from a robust market in ill-defined goods to an
207
anemic market in a rigorously reviewed commodity. Environmental
currencies must take into account both the interests of the transacting
208
Perhaps
parties and the externalities relevant to social welfare.
209
recent rulemaking acknowledging ecosystem services directly will
address some previous criticisms.
But wetlands assessment
methodologies need further testing to assure environmental
effectiveness while avoiding raising transaction costs to levels that
210
would prohibit trade.
Even as the new federal rule is being implemented, states may
create their own guidelines furthering the experimentation by
creating ecosystem services currency that retains fungibility and
simplicity, while capturing the relevant values. Currently, the ODSL
looks only to geographical range, hydrogeomorphic and Cowardin
classes, and a wetlands-type multiplier ratio to calculate trade
211
mitigation credits.
New guidance on an Oregon Rapid Wetland

204. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 612.
205. Id. at 611.
206. Id. at 624.
207. Id. at 612.
208. Id. at 668–89.
209. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg.
19,593 (Apr. 10, 2008) (modifying 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332 & 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
210. See generally, James Murphy, Jan Goldman-Carter, & Julie Sibbing, New Mitigation
Rule Promises More of the Same: Why The New Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail To
Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38 STETSON L. REV. 311 (2009) (finding that
mitigation has been a repeatedly failed promise, that the new rule retains the same loopholes,
and that the Corps failure to adequately monitor, enforce, and encourage avoidance are the
biggest threats to wetlands); J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman & Iris Goodman, Implementing the New
Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section 404 Compensatory Mitigation Program: A Catalyst
For Advancing Science And Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 251 (2009) (finding that the new
regulations acknowledge ecosystem services and move in the right direction, but that methods
for measuring wetlands ecology, economics, and geography are not yet sufficiently robust).
211. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Mitigation Bank Regions and Contact Information, http://
www.oregonstatelands.us/DSL/PERMITS/mitbank_status.shtml (last visited June 6, 2010); OR.
DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING GUIDEBOOK FOR OREGON §§ 4.2.1
– 4.2.8 (2000), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/docs/mitbank_guidebk.pdf.
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Assessment Protocol (“ORWAP”) has been released, which does not
rely on acreage but a more sophisticated analysis of function and
value done in term of “grouped services” like hydrologic function,
water quality, fish, aquatic habitat, and terrestrial habitat, rather than
212
on a single generic wetlands value. Looking at replacing functions
is a good start, but thinking only about functions may alter who
benefits from the associated ecosystem services, moving wetlands
213
away from urban areas and into rural ones.
While ORWAP was
designed mainly for developers, the Willamette Partnership’s
crediting promotes using its Counting on the Environment methods
to generate credits based on changes to wetland functions from an
enhancement project and to determine priority locations for
214
mitigation.
The Endangered Species Act generally prevents any action
215
which would kill or injure a species in danger of extinction.
This
216
includes any habitat modification that leads to any death or injury.
Consequently, many development projects around the nation could
violate the Act. However, in 1982, Congress amended the ESA to
allow the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) to issue permits
217
for an “incidental take” of a protected species.
To obtain an
incidental take permit, an applicant must prepare a habitat
218
USFWS also allows use of habitat
conservation plan (“HCP”).
credits from conservation banks as reasonable and prudent actions in
219
a “section 7 consultation” in accordance with the ESA.
USFWS recently began promoting market-based approaches for
mitigation requirements, conditions of particular HCP permits, which

212. OR. DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, GUIDANCE FOR USING THE OREGON RAPID WETLAND
ASSESSMENT
PROTOCOL (ORWAP) IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL PERMIT PROGRAMS 8 (2010), available at
http://www.oregonstatelands.us/DSL/WETLAND/docs/orwap_guide.pdf.
213. Ruhl, Salzman & Goodman, supra note 210, at 262.
214. See generally WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, WETLAND CREDITING PROCEDURE:
TRANSLATING FUNCTIONAL SCORES TO CREDITS ACCOUNTING (2009), available at http://
www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/orwap/WetlandCreditingProcedur
e_071309.pdf.
215. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2006).
216. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21, 17.3.
217. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1418
(1982); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
219. U.S DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, GUIDANCE FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT, USE, AND OPERATION OF CONSERVATION BANKS 3–4 (2003), available at
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/MemosLetters/conservation-banking.pdf.
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220

include the use of habitat conservation banks. Conservation banks
are parcels of land that are conserved and managed in perpetuity for
conservation of the specified listed species. Such banks allow
investors to assemble and restore prime habitat for endangered
species to create “credits” that can be sold to developers who must
mitigate habitat destruction as part of their HCP permit conditions or
as an action required due to consultation under section 7 of the
221
ESA.
In this market system, voluntary sellers hope to create
marketable credits that can be sold at a profit to buyers, who seek to
purchase credits for less than the cost of alternative mitigation and
avoidance approaches. Federal agencies believe this will help
assemble large permanently dedicated conservation sites with
222
professional management.
As with wetlands banking, difficulties
arise in trying to quantify habitat currencies for both restoration
benefits and development impacts. USFWS plans to make mitigation
credits available based on “habitat value conservation outcomes” and
223
to encourage active management.
Conservation banking for endangered species is at an early
development stage in most places, although California has used them
224
since the late 1990s.
ODOT created Oregon’s first conservation
bank to mitigate impacts of its bridge program on two endangered
plants, Cook’s lomatium and the large-flowered woolly meadowfoam,
as well as the threatened vernal pool fairy shrimp, a small, translucent
225
crustacean.
These species live in vernal pool habitat—small,
shallow wetlands that fill with water during fall and winter rains and
226
dry up in the spring and summer. These wetlands are very rare in
Oregon and throughout the nation.

220. Id. at 7.
221. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 43 (2005).
222. Id. at 44.
223. Amy J. Dona, Note, Crossing the Border: The Potential for Trans-Boundary
Endangered Species Conservation Banking, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 655, 670–72 (2008).
224. See DOUGLAS P. WHEELER & JAMES M. STROCK, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
OFFICIAL POLICY ON CONSERVATION BANKS (1995), available at http://www.ceres.ca.gov/
topic/banking/banking_policy.html; see also Fred Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second
Nature” of Wetlands, 39 ENVTL. L. 577, 580 (2009).
225. Scott Learn, ODOT Preserves Green Spaces to Offset Road-Building Damage, THE
OREGONIAN (Jul. 2, 2009), available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/
2009/07/odot_preserves_green_spaces_to.html; see also supra notes 144–145.
226. See id.
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In addition to being the first conservation bank in the state, the
227
ODOT bank addresses wetland impacts. Federal and state agencies
collaborated to make sure that approval of ODOT’s conservation
bank was subject to only one set of standards and procedures. This
substantially reduced the time and effort spent having the bank
approved and was an important factor in ODOT’s willingness to
228
become Oregon’s pioneer conservation banker. ODOT’s relatively
new MCBRT is attempting to meet mitigation needs by working with
229
the Willamette Partnership.
The Willamette Partnership has
230
developed a credit calculator for upland prairies that could generate
credits to mitigate impacts to the endangered Fender’s blue butterfly
231
as part of a regional HCP.
3. Additionality and Multi-Credit Accounting
In order for markets to work, buyers and sellers of services must
understand the rules that apply. This requires ecosystem service
markets to define terms important to their growth. Additionality is
the concept that credited ecosystem improvements must “represent
an overall increase in, or a [measurable] avoided reduction of,
ecosystem services, relative to those services that would have existed
232
without creating the credits.” Obviously, landowners should not be
able to generate salable credits for practices they were already
undertaking or required by existing law to perform. Additionality has
been an issue in many of the Oregon markets. For example, under
the DRC/Climate Trust Riparian Reforestation project, the question
arose as to whether a forest landowner required to retain trees in
233
riparian areas under the Oregon Forest Practices Act should be
allowed to sell offsets based on the carbon sequestered by those trees.
The answer to that was “no,” but credits could be created by
234
reforesting denuded riparian areas.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. OR. DEP’T OF TRANS., supra note 139, at 22.
230. PAUL ADAMUS, PROCEDURE FOR UPLAND PRAIRIE CREDIT CALCULATOR (2009),
available at http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/prairie/Upland
PrairieMetricProcedure_071409.pdf.
231. Willamette P’ship, Upland Prairie Habitat, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/
ecosystem-credit-accounting/upland-prairie-habitat (last visited May 12, 2010).
232. Willamette
P’ship,
A
Glossary
of
Important
Terms,
http://
www.willamettepartnership.org/ about-markets/glossary (last visited June 6, 2010).
233. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 527.610 to .785 (2009).
234. Climate Trust, Deschutes Riparian Reforestation, http://www.climatetrust.org/
deschutes.html (last visited June 7, 2010).
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A subcategory of additionality is financial additionality. This
refers to the ability of an ecosystem service seller “to demonstrate
that absent payments for credits the benefits of the action that
235
generated the credits would not have exceeded the costs.”
If a
practice is independently economically valuable, such as a forester
who plants trees for future harvest, it is argued that the practice
236
should not generate ecosystem service credits.
Credits should be
generated only when they truly provided the financial incentive to
undertake the action. This issue also arose on the Deschutes
Riparian Reforestation project.
Participating landowners were
required to grow trees longer than they normally would have in order
237
to qualify for credits.
Defining the difference between credit stacking and double
dipping raises similar problems, especially for multi-credit markets.
Credit stacking involves creating multiple, different types of
ecosystem credits from the same geographical area, such as a parcel
238
of land that contains both wetlands credits and habitat credits.
Double dipping occurs when a single output generates multiple
credits—such as a created wetland that generates wetland mitigation
credits, water quality credits, carbon sequestration credits, and
habitat conservation credits. The difference between credit stacking
and double dipping is subject to a debate between accounting for all
of the benefits of an ecosystem service and awarding a windfall to the
239
parcel without any extra investment.
Multiple credits from one site
may be justified if calculated together, as is being done by the
240
241
Willamette Partnership
and the Oregon Bridge Program.
Unbundling and valuing separable functions of an ecosystem is not
necessarily different from what real estate appraisers often do. What
is important to keep in mind is the underlying objective of payments
for ecosystem services: providing incentives for environmental
investment that would not otherwise exist. Unless landowners are
able to bundle the value of multiple credits, it may not be worthwhile
235. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 95, at 30.
236. See id., but see Sean Casten, Does Additionality Matter, GRIST (Mar. 27, 2008), available
at http://www.grist.org/article/carbon-policy-details-part-2.
237. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003.
238. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 95, at 30.
239. See Alice Kenny, When is Credit-Stacking a Double Dip?, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE
(Nov. 16, 2009), available
at http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/
article.page.php?page_id=7147.
240. See generally WILLAMETTE PARTNERSHIP, supra note 151.
241. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 128, at 19–20.
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for them to invest in the environmental restoration needed to create
the credits.
While recognizing the importance of defining key concepts,
terms, and measurements so that credit purchasers and sellers can
make equivalent trades, it is important not to mistake this for a need
for global uniformity. Uniform federal or global standards are
neither necessary nor appropriate in many markets. Ecosystem
services often will require markets that are custom-designed for the
particular participants and localities. The diversity of ecosystem
services and types demands a diversity of standards and tools to
242
measure and analyze those standards.
Standards must vary to
match the type and scale of the market—public versus private, large
basin versus small watershed, prairie versus wetlands. Ecotrust and
the Climate Trust participate in international carbon markets
complying with the rules and regulations that have been developed
243
for them. Groups like KBRT, CWS, the Freshwater Trust, and the
DRC operate in local markets, each with its own standards.
4. Geographic Scale
Geographic scale influences ecosystem service market
development in several ways beyond market size. Clearly, a global
carbon market is more likely to develop than a global habitat market
for a highly localized, rare species. A less obvious geographic scale
issue relates to the potential misalignment of buyers and sellers. For
example, if development impacting wetlands occurs primarily in
urbanizing areas, like Oregon’s Willamette Valley, and the
landowners interested in creating wetlands mitigation or restoration
banks are in rural areas with limited hydrologic or biological
connection to the impacted wetlands, the resulting mitigation banks
are unlikely to create ecosystem services equivalent to those
displaced. This is why ODSL is now promoting development of
244
mitigation banks in rapidly developing areas.

242. The Ecosystem-Based Management Tools Network website lists over 160 tools for
managing coastal and marine resources. Ecosystem-Based Mgmt. Tools Network, EBM Tools
Database, http://www.smartgrowthtools.org/ebmtools/index.php (last visited May 12, 2010).
Their list represents only non-terrestrial land use applications and is not even exhaustive of all
such tools in this category. Ecosystem-Based Mgmt. Tools Network, About EBM Tools,
http://www.ebmtools.org/about_ebm_tools.html (last visited May 12, 2010).
243. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
244. Personal conversation between the author and DSL Director, Louise Solliday, Fall
2009, Salem, Oregon.
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Closely related to geographic misalignment of buyers and sellers
are the problems posed by determining the appropriate market area
for a mitigation or conservation bank. For example, in the Deschutes
Groundwater Mitigation program, determining the “zone of
influence” within which credits must be obtained was a contentious
245
issue.
Under federal wetland mitigation bank guidance, the same
246
issue arises in defining appropriate geographic service areas.
Geographic scale also has important implications in terms of
ecological effects of the mitigation or conservation actions. Those
entering the market as sellers, particularly at the early stage of market
development, often do not own property where the most critical
ecological resources are located. For example, the DRC started its
water-leasing program with any landowner willing to lease water
247
instream just to get water rights holders used to leasing their rights.
The early leases were not prioritized or evaluated in terms of their
248
impact on aquatic ecological function. With the development of the
CBWTP, this changed, and all water acquisitions were prioritized and
249
evaluated.
Biodiversity conservation must occur at the landscape
scale, yet market participants do not always align with landscape-scale
conservation priorities. Adoption by all 50 states of formal State
250
Wildlife Conservation plans should help address this problem.
C. Market Development Requires Accountability
Demonstrating feasibility requires information.
During
individual ecosystem service projects, data should be gathered about
ecological benefits and the economic and operational systems needed
for the market to function. When pilot projects are in the
experimental phase, there are great opportunities for rigorous
monitoring, but too often monitoring and data gathering are skipped.
Yet, if more data is generated, pilot markets can be refined, and
accounting and measurement systems can be improved.
Ecosystem market standards should not only facilitate trading,
but they also should incorporate relevant values and be enforced to

245. See Pagel, supra note 55, at 30.
246. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,611 (Nov. 8, 1995).
247. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003.
248. Id.
249. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66, at 3.
250. See State Wildlife Action Plans, http://www.wildlifeactionplans.org/ (last visited June 7,
2010).
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make certain the promised environmental benefits materialize.
Overly simple (or inaccurate) currencies ignore a primary goal of
environmental legislation: to force entities to internalize their
251
externalities.
Externalities are the cost or benefits imparted to
parties that are not directly involved in a transaction as a seller or
252
buyer.
A common theme in ecosystem services markets is that
private uses—those subject to controlled distribution, exclusion, and
scarcity—allow for the easy determination of price and automatically
create a dynamic market, while public uses—those which are often
not excludable or rival—are often plagued by positive externalities
that are not easily captured by market signals and are ignored unless
253
government intervenes. If trades ignore or oversimplify the social
costs imposed, these criteria will not be preserved. The public and
environmental NGOs should expect trades to include meaningful
ecosystem functions, to be subject to objective and meaningful
monitoring and transparent data collection about trades, and to
254
reassess their goals continually to assure they are being met.
These concerns for standards that further the public interest have
been partially addressed in Oregon by the nature of the entities
establishing the markets. Many of the pilot Oregon markets are
being initiated by environmental organizations, not by the regulated
255
entities. The Freshwater Trust and the DRC are staffed by people
who passionately care about using markets to achieve environmental

251. Although environmental economics is now a robust discipline, the first generation of
United States environmental legislation was not based on economic theories and feasibility
studies, but rather commands to industries to curb activities that threatened human health and
the environment based on far-reaching public sentiment. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of
America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental
Law's First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77–80 (2001).
252. The most salient externality is pollution, where neither the purchaser of the final
product nor the producer who sells it directly pays for the pollution costs to health and
environment imposed on society. Ecosystem services, on the other hand, are often positive
externalities: the benefits they produce, e.g. photosynthesis or flood control, cannot readily be
sold on the market. J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 65 (2007).
253. Id. at 64-65.
254. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 680.
255. The Climate Trust, Ecotrust, The Freshwater Conservancy, DRC, KBRT, BEF, and
Willamette Partnership all are, or began as, private entities based on environmental concern.
Even those organizations that started by governments or regulated entities, e.g. Bonneville
Power Administration, and Clean Water Services, partner with environmental nonprofits. See
supra Part II.
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256

goals. The Willamette Partnership’s protocols directly incorporate
257
a “conflict of interest” check. As the government steps up its role
to homogenize and formalize environmental service market
standards, it must assure that the public interest continues to be met
in those markets. This will require transparency of data collection,
credit generation, and accounting. Government run or imposed
markets also should include requirements for ongoing independent
verification that the credits that are promised materialize. NGOs
should continue to play a role in the generation, verification, and
oversight of such credits.
Lastly, governments should create
procedures that allow NGOs and the public to challenge transactions
that are fraudulent or detrimental to public interest and to hold
legally responsible parties accountable.
The amount and type of monitoring and evaluation done on the
Oregon projects has varied. The ODOT Bridge Program had its
results reviewed independently by Oregon State University to
evaluate its strengths and lessons learned and retained an
independent third party to prepare a cost-benefit analysis of the
258
program. ODEQ has reviewed the Tualatin River NPDES permit
259
that it issued to Clean Water Services. The CBWTP was evaluated,
as a program, by a third-party professional evaluation firm whose
260
report was peer-reviewed by an academic panel. Ecotrust and The
Climate Trust both require independent third party monitoring of
261
projects that create carbon offsets.
The DRC has even paid for
stream-gauging stations to assure that the water it leased actually was

256. Clicking through to the biographies of lead staff shows decades of environmental
nonprofit experience. See Freshwater Trust, Staff, http://www.thefreshwatertrust.org/who-weare/staff (last visited June 6, 2010); Deschutes River Conservancy, Staff,
http://www.deschutesriver.org/About_Us/Staff/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010).
257. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ECOSYSTEM CREDIT REGISTRY CONFLICT OF INTEREST CODE
(2008),
available
at
http://www.willamettepartnership.org/tools-templates/
wp_conflict_of_interest_code.pdf.
258. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128.
259. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY CREDIT TRADING IN OREGON: A
CASE STUDY REPORT (2007), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/trading/docs/
wqtradingcasestudy.pdf.
260. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66; GAIL ACHTERMAN, SUSAN HANNA &
NOELWAH NETUSIL, REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST PLANNING AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL
ON THE EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE COLUMBIA BASIN WATER TRANSACTIONS PROGRAM
(2007),
available
at
cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/library/documents/CBWTP report Tech Committee FINAL .doc.
261. CLIMATE TRUST, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006), available at http://
www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/Climate_Trust_Annual_Report_2006.pdf.

Achterman_final_2.doc

Summer 2010]

7/17/2010 12:24:09 PM

STATE AND REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS

331

262

in the stream reach that it was intended to benefit. It is important
to note a distinction between monitoring and evaluation. Market
makers or regulators need to monitor to make sure that specific
projects are delivering the credits they have sold. They also need to
evaluate their overall market programs to make sure the anticipated
system-level results are being achieved.
D. Government Agencies Can Generate Demand
1. The Government as Standard Setters and Regulators
Because ecosystem services are often defuse, invisible,
probabilistic, and non-subtractable, private demand is difficult to
263
generate.
In theory, there is potential private demand for such
traditionally public goods—e.g., flood insurance providers investing in
264
water-storing forests —but such demand has not yet materialized.
Government’s main role has been to require private entities to
purchase mitigation. This role is vital, as demonstrated by the
creation of The Climate Trust in response to Oregon’s cap on carbon
dioxide emissions, the DRC’s groundwater mitigation bank in
response to state rules requiring offsets for all new groundwater
withdrawals, and creation of wetland and habitat mitigation banks.
Without the imposition of mitigation requirements by state and
federal agencies, markets are less likely to develop.
2. The Government as a Buyer of Services
State and federal governments can purchase ecosystem credits
directly in order to meet their own conservation and mitigation
objectives, thereby creating demand. Such government actions have
been instrumental in developing ecosystem markets in Oregon and
other states in the Pacific Northwest. The Bonneville Power
Administration, through its funding of the Columbia Basin Water
265
Transaction Program, has become the primary buyer of streamflow
266
In doing so, it has used markets to meet its fish and
restoration.
wildlife mitigation obligations. ODOT has performed a similar role

262. See Neuman, supra note 37, at 454 (purchasing a flow meter to gauge Evan’s Creek
instream water right lease).
263. See John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of
Preserving Earth's Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 951–52 (2001).
264. Salzman, supra note 137, at 894.
265. See supra Part II.B.3.
266. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66, at 32–35.
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by using wetland and habitat banks to mitigate for the impacts of its
267
Experience to date
highway and bridge construction projects.
suggests that other agencies may be able to achieve their conservation
objectives cost effectively through the use of ecosystem service
markets, even in situations where they are not mitigating for the
impacts of their own activities.
E. Government Agencies Can Convene Market Drivers and Facilitate
Market Development
Accounting systems and standards are unavailable for many
ecosystem services. Even where accounting systems and standards
exist, such as in wetlands mitigation, disagreements remain about how
they should be applied. Little institutional capacity exists to get
ecosystem markets started. Experience in Oregon and the Pacific
Northwest suggests that government agencies can play the important
role of convener, making sure all stakeholders are heard and that
policy questions are addressed. Government agency participants can
provide important scientific expertise, data, and conservation
priorities to all participants. State and federal agencies have played
this role in virtually all of the ecosystem service markets in Oregon
and the Northwest. Their deep engagement in and commitment to
the Willamette Partnership is probably the best example of this role.
268
Pilot programs are essential, but their usefulness is tempered if
their lessons are only learned locally. EPA, the Corps, USFWS,
National Marine Fisheries Services, and the Federal Highway
Administration should all serve as sources of best practices, project
successes and failures, and up to date scientific information. Larger
governments are integrative and have a greater capacity to hire
researchers, write reports, synthesize data, and transfer lessons
learned from local areas to broader regions.
The Oregon Bridge Program and the Clean Water Services’
NPDES permit demonstrate another key role of government agencies
in ecosystem service market development. If market approaches are
to be usable within existing regulatory systems, a great deal of
interagency work will be needed to align requirements under various
laws and regulations. ODOT and CWS were able to convene all of

267. See supra Part II.D.2.
268. See supra Part III.A.
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the necessary agencies and facilitate interagency agreement on how
269
ecosystem service markets could be used.
F. Markets Can Streamline Development and Restoration
The large number of state and federal resource agencies often
leads to compartmentalization, with agencies working only in their
own silos and looking at only the resource they manage. State and
federal agency coordination is critical to developing markets to
support high priority environmental restoration. ODOT’s Bridge
Program demonstrates this principle especially well. Interagency
coordination was not created overnight. It began with the formation
of the Collaborative Environmental and Transportation Agreement
270
for Streamlining (“CETAS”) in 2001. This agreement represents a
partnership of six Oregon agencies with six federal agencies actively
working to improve interagency cooperation, protect the
environment, and create programmatic approaches to comply with
271
environmental statutes. Within the partnership, ODOT was able to
develop a Comprehensive Mitigation and Conservation Strategy that
foresaw the need for performance standards, identifying mitigation
obligations, finding priority restoration areas, and establishing
272
assessment protocols.
The Federal Highway Administration’s
“Eco-Logical” program recommends all states engage in similar
integrated planning and coordination as a prerequisite to developing
273
other environmental programs and ecosystem service credits.
Without clear, agreed-upon ecosystem-restoration goals, there are
fewer opportunities to regulate development, to mobilize state
funding, and to direct public and private sector investment. But
through interagency partnership, developed at the outset, a strategic
focus and priorities emerged. Only from a foundation of shared
priorities and a continued commitment to consultation and
participation of all stakeholders can an effective ecosystem service
market emerge.
269. See Or. Dep’t of Transp., CETAS Streamlining, http://www.oregon.gov/
ODOT/HWY/GEOENVIRONMENTAL/cetas.shtml (last visited June 6, 2010).
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPREHENSIVE MITIGATION/CONSERVATION STRATEGY
(CMCS) WHITE PAPER 3-4 to 3-5 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/GeoEnvironmental/Environmental/Procedural%20Manuals/Wetlands/Wetlands%20Manual/01White%20paper.pdf.
273. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., ECO-LOGICAL: AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO
DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 9–17 (2006).
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Complex agency-by-agency permitting leads to costly, timeconsuming, and uncertain processes for developers, while adding to
the cost and time required for restoration and other credit generating
projects. This increased time leads to increased costs and uncertainty
for both parties. As the Freshwater Trust discovered, a sizeable
portion of restoration professionals’ time is spent securing permits
274
and funding.
Credit purchasers often prefer to contribute more
funds to restoration, over and above minimum mitigation
requirements, in exchange for expedited, outcome based permits.
This is what ODOT agreed to in the Bridge Program, and it achieved
the anticipated results—better environmental outcomes with
275
significant cost savings through expedited permitting.
IV. OREGON’S LATEST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES EXPERIMENT:
SENATE BILL 513
Oregon is committed to keeping up its momentum as a leader in
developing ecological service markets.
Experiments to date
demonstrate that these markets can lead to better environmental
outcomes at a lower cost to business and conservation organizations.
At the December 2007 Oregon Business Summit, business and
government leaders explicitly adopted an Ecosystem Services
276
Marketplace Initiative.
It seeks to build and expand markets for
carbon, wetlands, habitat, open space, and hazard reduction and to
277
develop an integrated ecosystem services marketplace. In 2008, two
workshops were held in Portland to start laying the foundation for the
278
initiative.
At the first workshop, ecosystem practitioners, state
government representatives, and ecosystem service experts from
other states participated in a brainstorming session on desired
outcomes, market barriers, roles and responsibilities of government,
and policy reforms needed to stimulate an ecosystem marketplace in
279
A second workshop brought the results of the first
Oregon.
workshop to state agency heads and staff who explored policies and
action strategies needed to bring the integrated marketplace to

274. FRESHWATER TRUST, supra note 158, at 6.
275. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 44–46.
276. See OR. BUSINESS PLAN, CREATING AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICES MARKETPLACE (2007),
available at http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/pdf/EcosystemServicesMarketplace.pdf.
277. Id. at 1.
278. INST. FOR NATURAL RES., supra note 95, at i.
279. Id.
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280

fruition.
The two workshops culminated with a report, “Policy
Cornerstones and Action Strategies for an Integrated Ecosystem
Marketplace in Oregon,” recommending Oregon legislation to
281
further the development of Oregon’s ecosystem marketplaces.
The 2009 Legislative Assembly took the bold step of
affirmatively recognizing ecosystem services by passing Oregon
282
S.B. 513 declares it “the policy of the
Senate Bill 513 (S.B. 513).
state to support the maintenance, enhancement, and restoration of
ecosystem services throughout Oregon, focusing on the protection of
283
land, water, air, soil, and native flora and fauna.”
The bill
anticipates that valuing ecosystem services will help landowners
diversify their incomes and help Oregonians enjoy enhanced health
284
and quality of life.
S.B. 513 “encourages” state agencies “to adopt and incorporate
adaptive management mechanisms” and to “use ecosystem services
285
markets as a means to meet mitigation needs.”
The act requires
that “[w]hen a state agency adopts a strategy or a decision that calls
for the mitigation of potentially adverse environmental consequences,
[it] must consider mitigation strategies that recognize the need for
286
biological connectivity and appropriate mitigation.”
Neither
“biological connectivity” nor “appropriate mitigation” are defined in
287
the Act, and agencies are not explicitly directed how or when to
weigh these factors. But it is significant that the legislature has
empowered and encouraged all Oregon agencies to consider
ecosystem services approaches and adaptive management.
Recognizing that developing ecosystem services markets will
take ongoing efforts by many agencies, non-profit organizations, and

280. Id.
281. Id. at 22–25.
282. S.B. 513, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009). This bill was sponsored by Oregon
State Senators Devlin and Atkinson and Oregon State Representatives Garrett and Gilliam and
signed by Governor Kulongoski; it was proposed by Defenders of Wildlife and was supported
by the Willamette Partnership, Oregon Homebuilders Association, The Nature Conservancy,
Oregon Forest Industries Council, Oregon Business Council, Ecotrust, Sustainable Northwest,
Wildlands Inc., Parametrix, Clean Water Services and the City of Portland. Sara Vickerman,
Ecosystem Markets Legislation: Oregon Approves Path-Breaking Legislation, 449 OR. INSIDER
17 (August 2009), available at http://www.oregonwaterquality.com/Insider%20Issues%20449452.html.
283. Or. S.B. 513 § 2.
284. Id. §§ 3(1), (4).
285. Id. § 4.
286. Id (emphasis added).
287. See id. § 1 (defining terms).
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businesses, and that more research is needed to make ecosystem
service markets work well, S.B. 513 directs the Oregon Sustainability
288
Board to convene an “ecosystem working group.”
This working
group is composed of representatives from local, state, and federal
agencies; Indian tribes; conservation organizations; developers; and
landowners from the private sector who are “active in improving the
289
ecological effectiveness of ecosystem services markets” and will
prepare a report and policy recommendations for the 2011
290
legislature. Specifically, the working group is expected to suggest to
the legislature overarching goals for ecosystem service markets,
methodologies to quantify ecosystem goals, ecological evaluation and
accounting systems, the appropriate role of government participation,
and the regulatory and voluntary policies required to stimulate
291
demand for ecosystem services payments.
S.B. 513 represents the start of the next phase of Oregon’s
experimentation in ecosystem service markets. It convenes all the
different players in market development to address past barriers to
market development and figure out how to develop integrated
markets. It goes beyond policies of “no net loss” to recognize that
292
some degraded ecological systems need restoration.
S.B. 513
recognizes some of the greatest challenges facing policy makers, from
293
establishing consistent methodology standards to the appropriate
294
role of government participation.
Explicit recognition of these
policy issues also demonstrates an understanding of just how much
needs to be done—in law, science, economics, and policy—and just
how great the opportunities are for ecosystem service markets’
295
growth.
V. CONCLUSION
States can play an important role in ecosystem service market
development. Oregon’s experience in the 1990s with markets for

288. See id. § 5(1)(a).
289. Or. S.B. § 5.
290. Id.
291. Id. § 5(2).
292. See id. § 2.
293. Id. § 5(2)(c).
294. Id. § 5(2)(e).
295. The ongoing efforts of the ad hoc and working groups can be seen on the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board’s website. Senate Bill 513 Ecosystem Services Markets
Working Group, http://oregon.gov/OWEB/SB513.shtml (last visited Jun. 23, 2010).
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carbon offsets and instream water rights laid the foundation on which
the Willamette Partnership and The Freshwater Trust have
developed more comprehensive, market-based environmental
restoration approaches. S.B. 513 institutionalizes Oregon’s
commitment to continued experimentation and pioneering efforts.
Future success will depend upon continued collaboration between
private organizations and state and federal agencies to create the
institutional capacity to support market-based methods. To assure a
robust marketplace that functions to the benefit of the environment
and humanity, the government must assure clear standards,
accountability, and scientific and technical expertise are provided to
participants in ecosystem services markets.

